The motor vehicle protective regime in the Philippines is made up of a complicated set of regulations. Imports of assembled vehicles are prohibited, with certain exceptions. Imports of sets of components (kits) to be assembled within the country are subject to tariffs. Firms are constrained as to the number of models produced and the amounts of imported, compared with domestic, components used. Also, firms assembling motor vehicles in the Philippines must export automobile industry products equal to given percentages of the value of imported kits.
Similar protective regimes have been used in several countries, especially in Latin America. 1 The set of restrictions affects both the sales price of the finished vehicles and the cost conditions of domestic assembly operations. The restriction on imports of assembled vehicles drives up the domestic prices of motor vehicles, encouraging domestic production, but the local content requirements and export requirements increase the cost of production for assembly operations. The protective regime and regulations impose costs on consumers and misallocate resources, encouraging high-cost domestic production.
This article develops a model to illustrate the economic impact and welfare cost of the import prohibition, local content requirements, and export requirements in the motor vehicle industry and then applies that model to Philippine data to generate rough estimates of the cost to the country of maintaining this type of protective regime. Section I outlines the protective regimes in the industry in the Philippines since 1949. Section II develops a model to illustrate the impact of the current protective regime. Section III uses that model to explain the transfers among groups, inefficiencies, and net welfare costs arising from the protection. Section IV applies the model to Philippine data. Section V investigates alternative liberalization scenarios. Section VI offers conclusions and policy recommendations.
I. THE PROTECTIVE REGIME FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY
The origins of the Philippine motor vehicle assembly industry can be traced back to 1949, when a shortage of foreign exchange led the government to impose foreign exchange controls. These controls denied foreign exchange to "nonessential" items, including passenger cars. By 1951, firms began assembling passenger cars in the Philippines from imported sets of components, or "kits." Another foreign exchange crisis and a desire to promote the motor vehicle sector prompted the government to further regulate the industry in 1973 by continuing to prohibit the importation of completely built-up (CBU) vehicles and by imposing local content requirements. In 1984 the program was revised to add export requirements: firms assembling cars had to earn foreign exchange by exporting to partially compensate for the foreign exchange used to import kits. 10.7 12.6 13.5 15,001-18,000 kilograms 10.9 12.9 13.8 a. Category 1, all Asian utility vehides up to 3,000 kilograms gross vehicle weight (GVW) ; category 11, all light commercial vehicles up to 3,000 kilograms GVW; category 111, all vehicles from 3,001 to 6,000 kilograms GVW; and category IV, all vehicles from 6,001 to 18,000 kilograms Gvw.
Source: Center for Research and Communication (1991: 21) .
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a. The percentage of the value of imported kits that is equal to the value of required automobile exports.
The administration that took power in 1986 adopted a new program the following year, patterned after the earlier protective regime. This program continued to ban imports of CBU vehicles competing with domestic production, increased the local content requirements year by year, and phased out the use of nonautomotive exports to meet export requirements. Table 1 lists the content requirements by type of vehicle under this new regime. Firms assembling cars are required to earn 50 percent of the foreign exchange needed to import kits, and firms assembling commercial vehicles must earn 25 percent of the foreign exchange needed to import kits. As shown in column I of table 2, credit for nonautomotive exports was gradually phased out, so that by 1993 only exports of automotive products qualified for the compensatory export requirements.
A MODEL OF THE PROTECTIVE REGIME IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY
This section develops a model to assess the impact of the import prohibitions and domestic content and export requirements and the interactions among them. The model simplifies the situation by ignoring differentiation among types of components, the tradeoff between domestic content and compensatory exports allowed in the regime, 2 regulations on minimum disassembly of components in kits, and prohibitions against importing certain components. The model assumes that the domestic content requirements and all export requirements are binding (that is, more assembled vehicles would be imported if there were no embargo, less domestic content would be used by assembly firms if there were no domestic content requirements, and exports of auto industry products would be less than the observed values without export requirements). 3 The assumption of increasing costs and competitive markets in this model may appear unrealistic, given that the motor vehicle industry is frequently cited as an example of an industry with economies of scale and oligopolistic market structure. However, the automobile industries in developing countries are essentially assembly operations. The imported kits normally contain the components produced under economies of scale, such as stamped body parts and engines. Up-front design and engineering costs, which, spread over large volumes of output, contribute to economies of scale in production, are paid by the company abroad producing the kits. The assembly operations unpack the components from the kit and assemble them, incorporating local components produced using labor-intensive, low-technology processes in which economies of scale are less important. The domestic demand for replacement parts also helps components producers take advantage of the economies of scale that may exist. In addition, the assumption of competition in the motor vehicle assembly industry may be less unrealistic for the Philippines than for most developing countries. In the Philippines there are 8 car assembly firms and 26 commercial vehicle assemblers participating in the Motor Vehicle Development Program. 4 If the country imposing the domestic content and compensatory export requirements is small, the world price, or import price, of assembled vehicles and of components can be taken as given. Assume there is only one type of finished or assembled vehicle, made by assembling a given number of components. Ignoring differences among components for the moment, a perfectly competitive domestic components industry manufactures components and a perfectly competitive domestic industry assembles vehicles by combining packages of imported components, called "kits," with domestically produced components. 5 Assembly firms must earn a given percentage of the foreign exchange necessary to import the kits by exporting auto industry products. Equilibrium prices and 3. If no assembled vehicles would be imported even without the embargo, firms would use more domestic content than the minimum required if unconstrained, and profit-maximizing firms would export more automotive products than specified by the compensatory export requirements, then none of the constraints in the protective regime would be binding and the regime would have no effect.
4. The relatively large number of official participants in the Motor Vehicle Development Program resulted from a liberalization of the program in 1990 to allow for the entry of new firms in the "people's car" category. In 1990, the base year for the estimation, the new entrants had not yet begun to operate. The three assemblers of passenger cars had rapidly changing market shares: in 1989 the shares were 29, 33, and 38 percent; in 1991, they were 51, 24, and 24 percent (see Guy and Mayo 1991) . Although the competitive model may be adequate for the Philippine market with the new entrants, work is now under way on the impact of domestic content and compensatory export requirements in a market with fewer firms and where economies of scale and strategic interactions among firms are important. This model will provide a richer analysis than, and interesting comparisons with, the results of the competitive model presented here.
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quantities in the market for assembled vehicles and in the market for components will be determined jointly because they are tied together not only by the normal input-output relations, but also by the domestic content and compensatory export requirements.
The Domestic Market for Assembled Vehicles
Given the prohibition on imports of assembled vehicles, the price of vehicles is determined by domestic demand and supply. Suppose that the quantity demanded (QA) is a decreasing function of the price of a vehicle (PA):
On the supply side, suppose that there is an upward-sloping supply function of value added in domestic assembly operations, in which the quantity of vehicles that firms are willing to assemble increases as the value added per unit (V) increases, 6 as in equation 2:
where QA is the quantity of finished vehicles produced. Suppose that the assembly technology requires a certain number of components, as, per vehicle. Let 6 be the proportion of total components that must be of domestic origin. 7 If 20 percent domestic content is required, then 6 = 0.2. Let XK be the compensatory export requirement for kits, that is, the proportion of the value of the imported kit that must be compensated for by exports. Then x(l -6)P', where Pc is the price of imported components, is the value of a kit at world market prices. Given the compensatory export requirements, the value of compensatory exports required to import each kit would be XKa( 1 -6)PC*. If components are bought (produced) at the domestic market price (cost) Pc but exported and sold at the world price PC, the cost to the firm of complying with the export requirements is (PC -PC)XKUO(l -6 )QA- 8 The tariff on kits, tK, would increase the cost of kits to the domestic assembly industry by the tariff revenue that would have to be paid per kit, or a(1 -5)PCtK. The cost of domestic components would equal a 6 Pc, where Pc is the domestic price of components. The assumption of a perfectly competitive assembly industry implies that in the long run unit cost equals price, so 6. This approach is similar to the one used by Corden (1971, chap. 3) . 7. Grossman (1981) shows that the domestic content requirements will have different effects if defined in terms of physical quantities or value added. The Philippine local content requirements can be treated as similar to a restriction in quantity terms. The contribution for each part is based on "points;' equal to the ratio of the free on board CKD price of the part to the CKD full pack price of the vehicle model. The valuations are based on world prices, not domestic prices, so price increases for domestic parts will not reduce the quantity of domestic parts required to fulfill the domestic content requirements.
8. The extra cost of complying with the export requirements was at times explicitly recognized by multinational firms. Bennett and Sharpe (1985: 186) report that Chrysler arranged for its Mexican assembly operations to transfer funds to its U.S. assembly operation to cover the extra cost of Mexican parts.
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Let r = (PC -PC)IPC be the percentage by which the prices of domestic components exceed the prices of imported components. The above equation can then be written:
can be thought of as the long-run inverse supply curve for the assembly industry. Supply price is the (vertical) sum of the domestic value added that would be required for firms to be willing to assemble various quantities of vehicles, the cost per vehicle of domestic components used as intermediate inputs [uPC6(1 + ir)], and the effective cost of the imported kit, which would equal caP*(1 -6)(1 + tK + XK1r).
If importation of assembled vehicles is prohibited, then the interaction of the demand for, and supply of, vehicles from domestic assemblers will determine market price. The equilibrium in the domestic market would occur where the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied: Given the domestic supply and demand conditions, the equilibrium price of vehicles in the domestic market would be determined where the quantity produced (QA) equals quantity demanded. The domestic price (PA) is not constrained by the price of a vehicle in the world market (PA) because imports are prohibited.
The Domestic Marketfor Components
Assume that the perfectly competitive domestic components industry has a supply curve for components, given in inverse form by
where QC is the quantity of components supplied by the domestic industry. The demand for domestic components includes the demand for components to be combined with imported kits for domestic assembly (a6 QA) and exports of components as compensatory exports for importing kits, xKa( 1 -6) (PV/PC)QA. Thus the total demand for components can be expressed as
Equations 5 and 6 determine Pc and QC, given Pc, XK, a, and 6, and holding QA constant. The equilibrium in the market for components is shown in figure 2 . The supply curve of the domestic components industry is shown by Sc and the demand curve for components by Dc. Equilibrium in the components market would occur at the price/quantity combination PC and Qc.
Under free trade, domestic producers would be forced to match the world market price of components P*, at which price the domestic production of components would be QC. Both the domestic content and compensatory export requirements increase the demand for components produced within the country, driving up price and production.
Given the links between the markets for domestic components and assembled vehicles, equations 1 to 6 jointly determine the endogenous variables PA, Q, QS, V, PC, and Qc, given the world market price of components P*, the technical coefficient ce, and the policy parameters tK, XK, and B. The equilibrium prices and quantities in both markets would be determined simultaneously.
III. TRANSFERS AMONG GROUPS AND THE NET COST OF THE PROTECTIVE REGIME
If there were no protective regime, and abstracting from transportation costs, the world market prices of both assembled autos and components would prevail 
QC* QC
Quantity within the respective domestic markets. In the components market, a quantity Qc would be produced at the price P*. The domestic assembly operations would have access to components at this price, so their supply curve would be the vertical sum of the value added per unit required for each output level and the cost of component inputs, aPc. This supply curve is shown by SA in figure 1 . At the free-trade price, PA, the domestic industry would assemble QA* units, and consumers would purchase DA units; DA -QA assembled vehicles would be imported. The costs of the entire protective regime can be assessed using the free-trade equilibrium as a benchmark for comparison. The tariff on kits, the domestic content requirements, and the compensatory export requirements increase input costs to assemblers and thus shift their supply curve upward from SA to SA. This upward shift can be decomposed into the cost increase per unit assembled as a result of the tariff, aP (1 -b)tK [ef in figure 1] , and the upward shift caused by the domestic content and compensatory export requirements, aPc(67r) + (1 -6 )xKir [be in figure 1 ]. Let SA show the industry supply curve with the tariff, but without the domestic content and compensatory export requirements. Thus the shift from SA to SA represents the impact of the tariff on kits, and the shift from SA to SA represents the impact of the domestic content and compensatory export requirements.
The welfare costs can be measured as the effects of distortions in the markets for assembled vehicles and components. The cost to consumers of the restric- Takacs 135 tions is area abcd, the reduction in consumer surplus compared with what it would be under free trade. Of this, area bcg is the traditional deadweight loss in consumption from higher assembled auto prices.
The consumer loss abcd can be subdivided into transfers to the government, the assembly industry, and the components manufacturers and deadweight losses from inefficient production in the assembly and components industries. Area nfqd represents an increase in profits to domestic assembly operations from the net effect of the entire protective regime. Area fgq represents a production deadweight loss, the extra cost of assembling QA -Q* vehicles within the country rather than buying them in the world market at PA. Area hefn is a transfer to the government from tariff revenues on kits.
The compensatory export requirements for kits and the domestic content requirements shift up the assembly industry supply curve from SA to SA. At the resulting domestic level of assembly operations, QA, area abeh represents the extra cost of components to assemblers because of these restrictions. The increased cost to domestic assemblers of area abeh is in part a transfer to domestic manufacturers of components and in part a deadweight efficiency loss. Area abeh in figure 1 equals area ijkl in figure 2.9 Area ijml represents a transfer to the domestic components manufacturers in the form of higher profits. Area jkm represents a deadweight loss-from the excess of domestic production costs over the price at which the components could have been purchased in the world market-for the extra output, mk, produced because of the domestic content requirements and the compensatory export requirements for kits. The net effect, ignoring transfers, is a consumption loss of bcg (in figure 1) and production deadweight losses of fgq (in figure 1) and jkm (in figure 2) in the assembly and components industries, respectively.
The various elements of the protective regime affect domestic assembly operations in different, and potentially contradictory, ways. Higher prices for finished vehicles encourage greater output from domestic assembly operations, whereas the domestic content and compensatory export requirements and the tariff on kits increase input costs and discourage domestic assembly activity. On balance, the effective rate of protection provided to domestic assembly operations could be either positive or negative, depending on the net impact of all the regulations.2 0
10. The prohibition of imports provides a greater protective effect the greater the domestic demand for vehicles. During the Philippine economic downturn in the early 1980s (which would have decreased domestic demand and decreased the ad valorem equivalent protection to the assembly industry), affiliates of Ford, Isuzu, and Toyota all shut down operations. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO THE PHILIPPINES
The magnitude of the areas in figures 1 and 2 identified above as net welfare losses and transfers from the entire protective regime can be calculated for the Philippines based on the actual values of the policy parameters-the tariff on kits, the compensatory export requirement on kits, and the percentage of components that must be sourced locally-and observed or assumed values of other variables and parameters for the motor vehicle industry. The method used to quantify the magnitude of the losses and transfers is explained in appendix A. Separate calculations were made for the Car Development Program (CDP) and the Commercial Vehicle Development Program (CVDP). Appendix B explains the sources of the data and the values of the variables and parameters used in the calculations. Tables 3 and 4 present the results of applying the model to the Philippine data. These estimates are rough approximations of the potential magnitudes of the costs, not exact estimates. To my knowledge, no estimate of the elasticity of demand for, or supply of, motor vehicles in the Philippines is available. A value of 1.0 was used for the elasticity of demand, consistent with estimates of the demand elasticity in the United States. 1 " The value of 1.0 for the elasticity of supply was used as a benchmark. Also, as explained in appendix B, the values of some parameters for cars had to be borrowed from the values for commercial vehicles for lack of data.
The estimated cost of the protective regime to purchasers of motor vehicles in 1990 was about 5.2 billion pesos ($215 million) a year. 1 2 This loss amounts to approximately 40 percent of the value of vehicle sales in the Philippines and is roughly equivalent to $3,800 per vehicle assembled domestically. The assembly industry and the components industry benefited from the protective regime, gaining 1.8 billion pesos ($73 million) and 1.2 billion pesos ($50 million), respectively. The transfer to producers amounted to about 22 percent of sales 11. Estimates of the elasticity of demand for automobiles in the United States are available from a number of sources. Hess (1977) reports previously estimated demand elasticities by Chow (1960) of 0.6 and 1.0 and by Juster and Wachtel (1972) of 0.9 and 1.1. Hess's model yields a somewhat larger elasticity estimate of 1.63. Suits (1958) reported previous estimates by Roos and von Szeliski (1939) of 1.5 and by Atkinson (1950) of 1.3. Suits's own model yielded estimates of 0.59 and 0.55. Given this range of results, the value of 1.0 appeared a reasonable value for the elasticity of demand for motor vehicles in this study.
12. All dollar amounts are in current U.S. dollars. A billion is 1,000 million. 
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V. ALTERNATIVE LIBERALIZATION SCENARIOS
The calculations in section IV estimate the cost of the entire protective regime, including tariffs, domestic content requirements, and compensatory export requirements. These costs are the gains that could be achieved by moving to completely free trade. Eliminating all of the restrictions overnight might lead to adjustment problems, but these could be limited by gradual liberalization. The major parameters of the system, specifically the percentage of domestic content required, the percentage of compensatory exports required for kits, and the tariff rates on kits, could be lowered in stages according to a preannounced schedule to allow gradual adjustment. The prohibition on imports of assembled vehicles could be replaced by a tariff and phased out gradually. Care would need to be taken during the process of liberalization to avoid inadvertently increasing the degree of effective protection to the assembly industry by, for example, phasing out tariffs on kits, domestic content requirements, and compensatory export requirements faster than the tariff on finished vehicles. Doing so would temporarily increase the costs of protection and provide false signals to the domestic industry by temporarily further encouraging domestic assembly operations. An alternative liberalization scenario would be to eliminate the quantitative restrictions in the current regime (the prohibition on imports of new assembled vehicles, and the domestic content and compensatory export requirements) but to maintain the existing tariff rates for assembled vehicles and kits.' 3 The welfare impact of eliminating the domestic content and compensatory export restrictions can be assessed by calculating the size of the transfers and net costs under a tariffs-only regime and comparing the results with those calculated in section IV for the entire existing protective regime.
Eliminating the embargo on imports of assembled vehicles would allow unlimited importation of vehicles at the current tariff rate. The price of vehicles to consumers would fall to the import price plus the tariff paid, or P (1 + tA), where tA is the ad valorem tariff on assembled vehicles. The market for assembled vehicles under the tariffs-only regime is illustrated in figure 3 . At the tariff rate tA, the domestic vehicle price would be PA-(1 + tA). DAT vehicles would be sold, of which QT would be assembled within the country and (DAT -QA) would be imported. The consumer surplus loss attributable to the tariff on assembled vehicles would be area rscd, of which scg would be a deadweight consumption loss.
On the production side, if the domestic content and compensatory export requirements were abolished, assembly firms would be free to import components at the world price, so the price of components would fall to PC(1 + tK) (figure 4). Production of components would fall to QC. The lower components cost would reduce assembly industry costs and shift the supply curve down (from the equivalent of SA in figure 1) to ST (figure 3). SAT lies above SA by the extra cost of components per vehicle caused by the tariff, O P tK. At the prevailing price for assembled vehicles under the tariff structure, P (1 + tA), the domestic industry would assemble QAT vehicles.
In the assembly industry, the deadweight loss from domestic production at costs above the world market price under the tariff regime would be area uvq (in figure 3 ). Area wuqd represents extra profits in the assembly industry above those it would earn under free trade. This represents a transfer from consumers to assembly firms. In the components industry, the deadweight loss under the tariffs-only regime would be yzm (in figure 4) , and the transfer to components manufacturers would be xyml.
The changes in the transfers and costs of protection that would result from switching to a tariffs-only regime appear in tables 5 and 6. The method of calculating these figures is also explained in appendix A. Eliminating the domestic content and compensatory export requirements while maintaining current tariff rates would benefit purchasers of vehicles. The consumer loss would drop by 4 percent for cars and 11 percent for commercial vehicles. The decrease is not very dramatic, because the existing tariff rate is fairly high (50 percent on cars and an average 46 percent on commercial vehicles).
The switch to a tariffs-only regime at current rates would greatly benefit the assembly industry. The significant drop in the cost of components would increase the effective rate of protection to assembly operations, boost the transfers to the assembly firms by about 21 percent, and increase the efficiency losses from assembly operations by about 39 percent. In contrast, the transfers to the components industry would be cut almost in half, and the efficiency losses from domestic production of components would fall by 65 percent. This result implies that an elimination of the domestic content and compensatory export requirements should be accompanied by a tariff cut on assembled vehicles to increase the gains to purchasers of vehicles and prevent an increase in the effective rate of protection to assembly operations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The motor vehicle industry in the Philippines is protected by a complicated set of regulations consisting of a virtual prohibition on imports of assembled vehi-cles, tariffs on imported components and assembled vehicles, domestic content requirements, and compensatory export requirements. This protective regime keeps vehicle prices high, maintains high-cost domestic production of both vehicles and components, and transfers large sums to special interest groups.
Purchasers of motor vehicles are hurt by the high vehicle prices. Assembly operations are encouraged by these high prices but discouraged by higher input costs resulting from the tariff on imported components and from the domestic content and compensatory export requirements. On balance, the entire protective regime could result in either a positive or negative effective rate of protection to vehicle assemblers. Evidence indicates that the 1990 Philippine protective regime provided a positive effective rate of protection.
Domestic producers of components are unambiguously helped by all of the elements of the protective regime. The tariff on kits protects them from imported components, the import restriction on assembled vehicles helps maintain domestic assembly operations and the domestic demand for components, the domestic content requirements force domestic assembly operations to use domestically produced components, and the compensatory export requirements for importing kits increase the demand for domestically produced components for export. The compensatory export requirements in fact act like an export subsidy to the components industry. All the elements of the protective regime increase the demand for components produced within the country and drive up both price and output in the market for domestic components.
Estimates indicate that the protective regime imposes substantial costs on consumers and encourages the allocation of resources to relatively high-cost activities. Eliminating the domestic content and compensatory export requirements at 1991 tariff rates would benefit consumers but would boost the effective rate of protection to assembly operations because of the substantial decrease in the cost of components. To avoid increasing the effective rate of protection to assembly operations during the liberalization, elimination of the domestic content and compensatory export requirements would need to be accompanied by decreases in the tariff rates on assembled vehicles.
APPENDIX A. QUANTIFYING THE WELFARE LOSSES AND TRANSFERS UNDER THE PROTECTIVE REGIME
The magnitude of the areas in figures 1 and 2 that represent the transfers and losses resulting from the protective regime can be estimated for the Philippines based on the actual values of the policy parameters-the tariff on kits, the compensatory export requirement on kits, and the percentage of components that must be sourced locally-and observed values of other variables for the motor vehicle industry. The calculations of welfare losses and transfers are based on a model (as illustrated in figures 1 and 2) with linear demand and supply curves, with the assumed elasticities at the initial protected equilibrium.
The consumer loss was identified as area abcd in figure 1. Let 4 = (PA -PA)/PA be the percentage by which the price of domestically assembled vehicles where VA is the value of domestic output of motor vehicles. The deadweight loss in consumption, area bcg, would be
The gain to the assembly industry (area nfqd) and the deadweight loss to the economy from excess assembly operations (area fgq) can be calculated by first noting that the height of each of these areas equals the net impact of the restrictive regime, that is, the amount, net of cost increases, by which revenue per vehicle assembled exceeds free-trade revenue per unit. Let this distance (fg) be designated N:
Let a = ciP I/P)4 be the share of components production in the final cost of a finished vehicle. Then
be value added per unit under free trade, let ESA be the elasticity of the supply of assembled vehicles with respect to value added, and note that QA -QA = ESA(QA/ V)N. Then, Let ESC be the elasticity of supply of components and Vc be the value of domestic production of components. The deadweight loss from excess production in the components industry is shown in figure 2 as area jkm:
The transfer to the domestic components industry as a result of the protective regime is area ijml, which equals area ijkl less the deadweight loss:
Equations A-1 through A-S were used to calculate the estimated costs and transfers associated with the protective regime for motor vehicles in the Philippines. Separate calculations were made for the CDP and the CVDP. The values of the variables and parameters used in the calculations are shown in table A-1. A detailed explanation of the sources of the data used can be found in appendix B. The impact of eliminating the domestic content and compensatory export requirements at current tariff rates can be assessed by calculating the transfers and costs that would result from a tariffs-only regime at current tariff levels and comparing these with the transfers and costs of the current protective regime. The transfers and losses from the tariff can be quantified using procedures similar to those above for the current protective regime.
Referring to figure 3, the consumer loss can be calculated as
Of this, the deadweight loss in consumption would be To calculate the transfers and costs associated with assembly operations under the tariff regime, denote distance uv as M, where
The transfer to the assembly industry under the tariff-only regime would be area wuqd:
The transfer to the components producers, area xyml in figure 4 , and the deadweight efficiency loss from extra components production, yzm, can be calculated as The tariff revenue collected under the current protective regime, To (from kit imports only), and under the tariff regime, T 1 (from imports of both kits and assembled vehicles) can also be estimated (referring to areas in figure 3 ):
APPENDIX B. VALUES OF THE VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS AND DATA SOURCES
Calculation of costs and transfers caused by the protective regime for the motor vehicle industry in the Philippines requires information on prices, production, price differentials between domestic and world prices, and tariff rates as well as some information on costs. Not all of this information is readily available. This appendix explains the sources used, the rationale for the specific values used when alternative estimates were available, and the assumptions used when it was necessary to assume values for particular parameters. The base year of comparison is 1990. 
XK
Compensatory export requirement for kits. The compensatory export requirement for imports of kits to assemble passenger vehicles is 50 percent. The requirement that exports be automotive products is being phased in. In 1990, 40 percent of the compensatory exports had to be auto industry products. Thus the effective requirement for exports of auto industry products was 20 percent. The compensatory export requirement for imports of kits to assemble commercial vehicles is 25 percent. The phase-in of the requirement that exports be auto industry products reached 40 percent in 1990, which implies an effective compensatory export requirement of auto industry parts of 10 percent. a Ratio of the cost of components to the final cost of a vehicle. For commercial vehicles, the value was set at 0.74, calculated as a weighted average (weighted by production) of the ratio for trucks (0.743) and buses (0.690). In the absence of specific information for passenger vehicles, the same value was used. The figures for trucks and buses were calculated from data on CKD kits and local components as a percentage of ex-factory prices from the Center for Research and Communication (1991: 10 Fund 1993) . The value of components production does not include the manufacture of replacement parts. rlDA Elasticity of demand for assembled motor vehicles. The elasticity is assumed to be equal to 1. ESA Elasticity of supply of value added in motor vehicle assembly. The elasticity is assumed to be equal to 1.
E,s
Elasticity of supply of components industry. The elasticity is assumed to be equal to 1.
